Sartre's polities can be eharaeterized as a monumental attempt to think against oneself, that is to say engineer the eollectivization of his philosophy of eontingeney and individual freedom. Tbe result of~is transformation is his political "anarehism" (a tenn used by Sartre himself although without any partieular historieal reference).l This is perhaps the best way to describe his positions, at onee during his mainly apolitical youth before the war, during bis relations with the Communist movement in the late forties and in the fifties, and most elearly during bis work with tbe various liberation and youth movements of the late sixties and the seventies. In that sense, T. Flynn, for example, is quite rigbt to see in one of tbe slogans of tbe 1968 revolt in Franee, "I'imagination au pouvoir," a good eoncentrate of Sartrean polities. 2 I would further eontend that this final period is one of Sartrean anarehism par excellence: during that time he finally finds himself at home in tbe political movements in France, although in the seventies his writings are far less original than before, no doubt because Sartre had lost the guilty eonscienee he had in the postwar period both towards the Communists and towards himselfwhieh seemed to give rise to his most brilliant work in politieal issues. I want to reflect for a moment on this anarchism, first by briefly stating its basic strueture, then by evoking some of its DWlifestations, finally by suggesting its significance for us today. I hope thereby to put into some sort of perspective that most elusive object: Sartre's conception of political legitimacy.
ISee for exalnple -Autoportrait asoixante-dix ans," in SilualiofLS :t, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 155.
1.r. Flynn, -L'imagination au pouvoir: the evolution of Sartre'. aocial and political thoughl,"
in Crilical Essays on Jean-Paul Sartre, R. Wilcock. (ed.) , O. K. Hall and Co., Boston, 1988. • The structuring thesis of Sartre's politics is what can be called his pbilosopbical anarcbism, namely the freedom defined in bis ontology of nothingness as the non-eoincidence of consciousness with itself, and best expressed (even before the definition of the For-itself in Being and Nothingness) as the freedom of the imagination, whereby consciousness holds the real at a distance and makes that everything is possible. 3 The model here is the creative freedom of the artist; on this basis Sartre attempts to think bis own existence (in Nausea as made explicit in Words) , existence in general (in Being anti Nothingness) , and finally the political sphere. One reason Sartre's political thought exerts such fascination, while being widely criticized for its weaknesses and tumabouts, is that it proceeds from bis fundamental personal fantasy: self-creation, and that he projects it into the debates of modem political theory which are themselves obsessed with the question of legitimacy. Like Rousseau who feeds his political project with the meat of intimate experience, 4 it is Sartre as bastard, comedian and traitor, who continues the last two centuries' quest for the founding principles of political order. On the basis of his effort to legitimize existence without recourse to the lies of the "spirit of seriousness," Sartre tries to come to grips with the political problem of modemity: the self-institution of society without a transcendent framework of legitimacy. Thus while confronting Stalinism, the main political challenge of his generation, Sartre makes his the dramatic image the French Revolution gave of itself-or at least the Jacobins as inspired by Rousseau-, that of starting anew after the destruction of the Old Order: the myth of a new origin symbolized by the execution of the King. S In his autobiography Sartre evokes his uncertain overcoming of the fantasy of the 3See the basic opposition of imagination and' perception put in plaee in L '!maginaire, Oallimard, Paris. 1939 (Psychology ofthe Imagination, Philosophieal Library, N.Y., 1948 , pal1icularly in the last ch8pter on 811. 4Ahhough seldom explored, Sal1re's theoretical relationship with Rousscau seems to me one of the most fnaitful approaches for the understanding of Sal1rean thought.
• tried to suggest some avenues for this in my "Solitude el sociabilib~: Rousseau el Sal1re,· in Dialogue, Canadian Philosophiea) Review, vol. 24, No 3, 1987. 5F . George makes this point very weil in SarIre, cd. C. Bourgeois, Paris, 1976, U, ., eh. S.
writer through political commitment: you can get rid of a neurosis but you are never cured of yourself. 6 Thus bis politics, particularly in the Critique 01 Dialeetical Reason, as has often been shown, approach collective existence on the basis of an individual praxis modelIed on the form of intentional consciousness (as lack, non-eoincidence, pure movement towards...), just as Rousseau's natural man was the measure for the principles of his Social ContraCI. Tbe legitimization of existence through the experience of contingency and absolute freedom provides both the instruments and the criteria to approach the social order through the experience of its intelligibility. Sartre's political thought belongs then to a tradition for which politicallegitimacy is ultimately grounded in a moral or an aesthetic characterization o.f existence, nther than being understood in terms of institutional or juridical solutions. Again, in Rousseau's Contraet human nature is remodelled in order to recreate in social existence the unity which was that of the solitary individual, 7 and on the basis of tbe natural feelings of compassion or pityB social virtues can lead to the transparency and unity of tbe hearts of men intbe community-which the Revolution will call •fratemity· and attempt to make one of the bases of the new social order. This ·politics of virtue· is echoed by Sartre's ·politics of freedom,· his attempt, as Merleau-Ponty put it, to ·give freedom a political line,·9 not on the basis of a set of intimate feelings defining natural man. of course, but on the basis of Sartre's intuition of his own illegitimacy answered by his philosophy of aesthetic freedom.
But beyond this common moralism, it is the difference between their political projects which is instructive and which simultaneously sets Sartre quite apart from Rousseau's political thought. In his Contraet Rousseau tries to translate the ideals of natural existence into conventions and artificial 6Les MOlS, OaUimard, Paris, 1964 , p. 212 (WonLs, Penguin Bookl, London, 1967 institutions, and he does this primarily through the Law which, as the expression of the General Will, gives concrete reality to the contract in each society. Natural man is denaturalized, and bis natural rights are alienated: they are exchanged for new ones in order to establish a social order which will permit men to live freely with others. 10 Sartre, on the other hand, attempts to extend the form of the individual project, when, in the Critique, he makes individual praxis the "mould" for common praxis 11 and the "motive force" of social unification. 12 The latter is undeniably a development when compared to the conflict of the looks in Being and Nothingness: through the introduction of the unifying Third, each praxis can become the Same as the others by interiorizing, through a common project, the multiplicity of praxes; and this implies that reciprocity, and not individual authenticity, is the standard for collective existence and for the very definition of what is human. But since this standard is direct1y at work in the Critique's approach to the forms laken by any political order, the modes of common praxis (from fusion to pledge to organization to institution) become moments of a degradation in relation to the cardinal moment of fusion which, alone, embodies that moral standard of reciprocity. This is confirmed, in the Critique, by the way reciprocity formally reproduces the authenticity of Being and Nothingness. Just group as a hyperorganism). Also, just as the For-itself constantly attempted to objectify and recuperate its own spontaneity througb reflexion and the constitution of an Ego, the group attempts to maintain itself against its dissolution through a pledge,13 that is through the internal violence of fraternity-terror and its subsequent forms. And again. just as the perspective of authenticity was not a rejection of reflexion but rather an attempt to define the path of its purification. the perspective of reciprocity does not reject the pledge-it is the "origin of humanity" says Sartre I4 _; one can even say that he makes of a purified pledge the decisive, although implicit, theme underlying the whole Critique. IS But tbis implicit horizon remains irrevocably "out of bounds": it implies breaking the mesh of violence, .the original violence of matter, from which stems the counter-violence of group praxis; and only the overcoming of scarcity and need, that is of the very basis of bistory and of humanity as we know them, can fulfi11 tbis requirement. 16 The problem here is not so much Sartrets so-ca11ed bistorical pessimism, as the fact that the political transposition of bis earlier ..radical conversion" structures the Crilique (and tbis is true of the wbole of Sartrets political thought) in such a way that positive consideration of political legitimacy is constantly both sought and excluded; by politicallegitimacy I mean an order of institutioDS embodying the specific constraints of the public sphere of existence. In Sartre!s approach no form of collective existence other than the ephemeral moment of fusion can provide an adequate translation of the standard of reciprocity. The Apocalypse of fusion obviously cannot serve as a yardstick or even an ideal reference in the elaboration of a political order, since it is defined (between the "violence of 13See Ibe role of pledge or vow in L 'E're e' le Man', Gallimard, Paril, 1943, necessity" and the "necessity of violence") as that which escapes institutional petrification. AnY' legitimate articulation of the individual to the whole of society seems excluded by what amounts to a politics 0/ reciprocity,that is to say an anti-political politics, where the requirements of reciprocity contradict the political nature of the political. As opposed to Rousseau, Sartre does not create a method for the elaboration of legitimate fonns of collective existence, but a logic for the subversion of all such forms.
In order to better understand this subversion of the political as such, one must think back to anarchism in a more strictly historical sense. In the XIXth century the critique of the bourgeois political order resulting from the French Revolution (and, according to many, betraying its ideals) is largely a critique of the separation of that order from society, a denunciation of the hypocrisy and formalism of bourgeois democratic institutions. Generally speaking, that critique is conducted either in tenns of a reunification of the spheres of civil society and the State through the latter (broadly speaking this is the Hegelian conception, and that of the socialist tradition especially in its concern with strategies of transition and problems of power, which led to the "science" of politics of leninism and stalinism); or in tenns of the abolition of the political sphere in the name of a spontaneous accord between men as economic forces. This anarchist tradition, primarily initiated by Proudhon in France, t 7 is partly inspired by Rousseau's idea of the contract as a unity of wills, but at the same time it vigorously opposes it to emphasize another aspect of his thought: direct democracy and the rejection of political representation. In that way anarchism does away with the polilical dimension of Rousseau's project, claiming that the political institutions of the General Will, namely the Lawand the Govemment, eontradiet an authentie eommunity of citizens. In the end the anarchist contract limits itself to the self-organization of social forces through a multiplicity of small cODtracts, ODe leading to the other and excluding any overall political or juridical fiction uniting them, since this would imply the alienation of particular 170n this, see P. J. Proudhon, Idee generale de la Revolution dU Xl~-siicle, Oamier, Paris, 1851, Quatri~me elude: "Du principe de l'Autorite." citizens' rights to the Wbole. 18 As mentioned above, Sartre takes this path when he extends the model of intentional consciousness to group existence. It leads him to the only "contract" he would consider legitimate: the transparency of the group in fusion. 19 Indeed bis principle of individual praxis, when understood as a criterion for political legitimacy, goes even further than this anarchism since the legitimate modes of collective economic existence in the various anarchist and utopian schemes of the XIXth century, such as associationism, mutualism, federalism, are themselves expressions of pratico-inert alienation, no less than the obvious institutions of the Stale or the Law. 20 Thus both Sartre and anarchism define a political project on the basis of a eritique of all political institutions as such. And i~is this paradoxical pattern of political praelice whieh is eharaeteristie of those movements of direct democraey of the seventies in Franee with whieh Sartre will feel at horne.
• One of the obvious features of this paradoxieal project, whieh relates it so intimately to Sartre's trajectory, will enable it to have a considerable impact in the seventies in Europe: it will DWlifest itself through a constant referenee not primarily to anarchism but to marxism, socialist revolution and the proletariat. Discarding any coneern with influenees or orthodoxy, I will make abrief l'The ambiguitiel of RouIscau'l politiealthought are well-tnown, and have led 10 him being interpreted, on the one hand, al the initiator of a tradition of moral regeneration, in whieh easc his opposition to politieal repreaentation is scen as a fundamental alpeet of his thought; or on the olher hand, in a Kantian reading, al initiating a tradition for whieh regeneration remaina in doubt, where the spherel of individual morality and publie life are kept separate, in whieh easc his oppolitionto politieal representation is given a weaker meaning: representation il not acen al a failure to realize man'I uwty with himself but a. eorresponding to neeessary social divisions for the realization of freedom.
19Some of the fonnulation. Sartre gives to hil opposition to politieal repreaentation are partieularly telling, for example when he saylthatthe problem is not to find a man 10 repreaenl five thousand olhen~ut to find a way for that man to be thoae five thousand othen: On " raison de se rivol'er (with P. Vietor and P. Oavi), La France lIuvage, Paria, 1974, p. 30S.
One eould luggest in that sense that Sartte ia maybe eloscr to Stimer'a radieal Egoilm than he ia to Proudhon. historical point to try to shed light on this. A decisive aspect of Marx 's thought, that is seldom sufficiently stressed but was dominant in bis first works and set an important pattern for his and subsequent political thought, is bis critique of the separation of politics as a distinct sphere of existence, what Man calls in the Jewish Quesl;on the "double existence" of man and citizen (in Rousseau's terms) or of civil society and the State (in Hegel's terms). Over and against the illusion and the separation inherent in bourgeois democracy, Man wants to acbieve a real or "actual democracy" by realizing man's species being or generic being which is not represented in aseparate sphere but is immediately polilical. 21 By reason of bis labor and bis needs, man is the immediate representative of other men, since the species is immanent to the individual, and tbis generic Iife must and will be rediscovered in the bistorical process. Rather than redefine politics against its bourgeois fonn, Marx claims to absorb a fictitious and separate sphere into areal unity, and this opens a practical perspective that avoids the political problem as such in the name of a coming apolitical unity. These two key factors, generic existence and history, are given a new meaning in Sartre's marxism of course: individual praxis and reciprocal common praxis define the historical totalization as intelligible, rather than production relations; and ultimately totalization can only deliver its promise of true reciprocity through a most problematic overcoming of scarcity. As a result, the political institutions dismissed by Marx as unreal are thoroughly discussed by Sartre: the existence of a stalinist party and State caused him after all to rethink Marxian epistemology. He approaches these institutions as adegradation of individual praxis, therefore as forms of violence, which implies that the historical process has become locked in the circle of institutional violence. If these differences with Marx shed light on Sartre's social thought, it is because he develops them on a basis which is in fact very close to the position of the early Marx (his critique of politics), while resting on Sartre's own philosophical foundations (the standard of transparericy, the horizon of fusion). By socializing the problematic of individual freedom Sartre seems to provide a specific version of what can be described as the anarchism of Marx 's early critique of separation in bourgeois politics. 22 The texts before the Critique,23 where Sartre explains some of bis pbilosopbical reasons for adhering to marxism, are most telling here: for example when he states tbat the proletariat uDhindered by any institutional or ideological inertia embodies pure possibility and thus the authenticity of praxis itself. The radical alienation of the proletariat allows it to express the pure freedom wbich defines humanity24_in the same way, one could say, as Rousseau's "peuple" is spontaneously good, expressing by the simplicity of its condition something of man's good nature before the corrupting effect. of socialization. When Sartre constlllcts bis own social pbilo80phy later on in, the Crilique, bis approach is somewhat more subtle, but the fundamental reasons behind his attraction to marxism remain UDchanged,~bis analyses of Engels' economism make clear: according to Sartre they reduce bistory 10 a process of production and expel the stmggle of praxis from it. 25 In tbis way, like many others in the sixties and seveoties, Sartre is able to criticize stalinist marxism in the name of Marx, without questioning Marx's original relation to politics, namely that since man is directly sociable, all political institutions must be demystified because they separate man from 24"Le proletariat n'est qu'cn aete, iI est aete," WritCI Sartrc ("Lei communiltcl el la paix," p. 207). From this foliowl the role attributed to the party of thc proletariat (at a time whcn Sal1rc strongly fccls thc nced to wort with thc French Communial') as ita unifyin. principlo, without which thc prolctariat is nothinl and retuma 10 dust. Thc party can thcn bc dcfincd a. "I'incamation pure ct simple dc la praxis" ("Les communialcs ct la paix," p.. 241). Sce allO "Materialismc ct Rcvolution," in Situations 111, GaUimard, Paris, 1948, on how lOCial revolution livc. cxpression 10 the essential illegitimacy of thc oppressed and thus to human frecdom. bimself. For Sartre, however, not only are these institutions a mystification,26 they also embody a hidden violence whicb requires counter-violence so tbat man can resist what separates him from himself and from others. Political practice can then be reduced to a movement of spontaneous and violent reaction or resistance to the violence of institutionalization-wbether it be tbat of bureaucratic stalinism, fascism or liberal democracy-; and as a result actual political action receives from its non-political end a rationale of revolt against all power. When tbis anarchism, wbich constantly refers itself to marxism and takes tbe form of defiance and resistance towards all institutional politics, comes to life historically in France in 1968, Sartre finds a concrete confirmation of bis efforts and something of a political home for his initial philosophy of freedom. Everything is indeed possible when the only principle is a non-principle: spontaneity, and wben tbe struggle is directed not so much against the State or the ruling-class but against any and all forms of social inertia. Decapitated of any political expression, Rousseau's political moralism becomes in Sartre the feeling of immediate reciprocity which can emerge from direct relations between individuals: either in exceptional and instantaneous mass fusions (where it is only accessible through historical imagery), or more often in the experience of friendship. small-scale cooperation. intimate fratemity, which Sartre so appreciates in the leftist groups he works with in the seventies.
Wbat is so striking in Sartre·s political itinerary is that be is constantly, and often explicitly, trying to come to grips with some of these very difficulties. When in the postwar years he battles with his own moralism and with his often discussed "problem of mediations, "27 he revives Hegel·s critique of Rousseau·s abstract politics. which had produced, through the practice of the Jacobins. the Terror of the French Revolution as a result of trying to realize the General Will immediately instead of embodying freedom in the adequate social institutions and thereby consenting to a necessary alienation of freedom. 28 Coming after Merleau-Ponty's analyses, the Critique is Sartre's effort to confront on tbe theoretical plane the very problem of institutions and of social passivity, left UDthought by marxism. But if the bad conscience of the moralist has disappeared, Sartre does not change bis basic course; such a change would imply thinking through the relationship between, on the one hand, ontological freedom asthe transcendence of the For-itself or, in the Critique, as counter-violence, and, on the other hand, a specifically political freedom defined through the constraints required for its realization. 29 The pattern of absolute freedom "eating away" freedom itself as defined in Being and NOlhingness,30 or of praxis "eating away" praxis in the Critique as expressed througb the telling dualities of "pratico-inert" and "fratemity-terror," does not deny, in any way, the resistance of things and the adversity of other men; but it forces one to define politics simply as the free act of radically overcoming adversity in the name of reciprocity.
Tbis pattern provides Sartre with a formidable weapon for the crltique of institutional politics, but it limits bis own positive interventions to a serles of antinomies which, without tbe common reference of individuals to some Law, exclude the possibility of deliberation, dialogue and therefore compromise. This can be illustrated both weil before and weil after the Critique on the question of spontaneity and organization. For example, during the discussion of a 31and again concerning the maoist notion of "creuset" (melting-potjJ2 in the seventies, Sartre endlessly confronts the contradictory requirements of "liberterevolte" and "libert6-pouvoir, ,,33 or simply recognizes that he has no solution to offer conceming the problem of stable structures both required by political action and threatening it by inertia. 34 In the seventies, his anti-institutionalism reaches its peak when he discusses such issues as the political status of the revolutionary intellectual, of the teacher or of the psychoanalyst,35 where a logic of exclusion moralizes each question in a spirit which is best expressed, in earlier texts on third-world liberation, by the demandthat man "recreate himself" through violent revolt,36 or better still by this even earlier description of the poetry of negritude:
Thus negritude is dialectic, it i. not only nor primarily the unfolding of atavistic inatincb; it represenb the surpas.ina of a fixed situation by a free conacience. Myth dolorous and full o( hope, Negritude, born of Evil and pregnant of I future Oood, and living as I woman who is born to die Ind who senses her own death even in the 35See respectively "L'ami du peuple" and "La jeunesse pi~g~e" in Siluations VIII; and "L'homme au magn~tophone," in Situations IX, GIUimard, Plris, 1972. 36preface to Fanon'. Les Damnes de la terre, in Situations V, Gallimard, Paris, 1964: "Quand SI rage~clate," writes Sartre of the colonized, "i1 retrouve SI transparence perdue (...) le voici legitim~par un droit clui va naitre, qui nait chaque jour au feu" (pp. 183-84). same time that it i. prophet of ila birth and of ita agony. it rcmaina the exi.tential attitude chosen by free men and lived ablOluacly, to Ihe dreg•. 37 Some of Sartre's expressions here are reminiscent of Anny's ·perfect moments" in Nausea, and describe impeccably the fleeting moment ofthe group in fusion; they are perhaps bis best statement of the nature of politicallegitimacy in bis view, of its underlying aesthetic motive, of the artist's posture as its basic model. This model implies 00 flight from the political scene however, no avoidance of social commitment or responsibility: Sartre ·shoulders the burden" of the political constraints of his epoch, but according to a non-political mode, with such eriteria as freedom of the imagination as opposed to inertia, and the unanimity of fusion as opposed to conflict, enabling him' to make dramatically obvious the moral and ontological stakes, but simultaneously making bim avoid the an;culation of the opposiog poles he brings to the fore-that articulation being precisely, one could argue, the object of political theory.
• Dismissing the General Will and disqualifyingas ·absurd" the dictatorship ofthe proletariat,38 tbe Crilique renders explicit wbat Sartret s practical interventions will i11ustrate in the seventies: the questioning of any general political project: "If it were really necessary to find a foundation for sovereignty, we would be searching for a long time: for there is no such thing 37"Orph6e noir" (1948) GaUimard, Paris, 1971-2, vol. I. pp. 831-4. (...) Man is sovereign. "39 History remains the framework of course, but as an unfinished totalization, as the scene of an infinity of mediations between men and things, praxis and inertia, not as Progress, Reason or even Revolution. Sartre's position remains that of the "universal intellectual," aiming at agiobai alternative project in terms of an historical finality and structured by the experience of freedom frostrated by power and finally overcoming it. But everything indicates that the Critique's rethinking of marxism is, despite itself, carefully putting in place all that is required to ruin such a project, as if Sartre was pointing toward a radical questioning of the traditional, finalist and sovereignist, vision of politicallegitimacy, since there remains no central power to be seized by the revolutionaries and no distinctions and degrees in political institutions to be worked on by tbe reformists. What is left (for the "beautiful souls"?) is a politics of punctual, local resistance with no other end than itself, and aesthetic anarchism; and this is by no means an abstract construction since it corresponds to the concrete militancy of the seventies in which Sartre revelled, characterized at once by a refusal to go beyond freedom as sheer independence and revolt, and by the demand that these values of individual independence be given immediate reality-which is tantamount to squaring the circle. 40 Hence I think it is not possible to say more conceming the meaning of this political thought today than simply to acknowledge that Sartre's failure in the Cr;t;que opened the door for the current wave of post-marxism. 41 What is at stake may be discemible by relating Sartre's politics to that of another contemporary thinker, Foucault, apparently Sartre's philosophical opposite, but himself very much at home in the movements of the seventies in France and to whose work those same tenns of anarchism, local resistance and political aesthetic:ism have often and quite correctly been applied. Like Sartre conducting simultaneously his analyses of the pratico-inert and group violence and his practice ()f punctual resistance to all power, Foucault minutely decodes the modem system_ of 'normalization and social control while participating in J9Critique, p. 588 (CDR, p. 610 localized and Iimited initiatives of contestatiOD. Wbatever their differing intentions, they both seem to be encouraging all initiatives which undermine power relations and 10 be providing tool kits whereby social institutions can be demystified; but nothing more. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system, .42 says Foucault; and Sartre, as weil as the activists of the seventies, would concur. Any general political project means new controls and new disciplines, for Foucault; it means the cycle of petrification and violence, for Sartre. So while Sartre's effort is to construct ajustification for something more than immediate resistance to power, whereas Foucault's effort is to deconstruct any such justification; and while Sartre constantly moralizes politics whereas Foucault describes i~amoral functioning, they nevertheless find themselves witb similar political stances.
What makes them so different and yet so similar can be found in the philosophical positions underlying their politics. Foucault's politics follows from his Nietzschean diagnosis of the modem world as nihilism, and if he is at ease in the post-'68 period it is because the philosophical significance of tbat social movement is by no means a triumph of humanism, as is often suggested, but a questioning of any moral or political order in the name of individual independence, of relativism, of what was often referred to at that time in Prance as "Ie droit a la difference.· Foucault's deconstruction of the will to truth and his guerrilla style of political writings (on medical, carceral, sexual power relations) bolb correspond to and enhance such an ethic of resistance. On that basis Foucault has no trouble reading the difficulties of Sartre's unfinished project of historical intelligibility, and his continual effort to establish some sort of universality allowing for coherent moral and political action, in terms of the inevitable impasse of modem anthropologies caught in the circle aod the doubles of the "analytic of finitude. tt43 Whether it is by trying to conciliate phenomenology and marxism or by trying to salvage some transcendent referenee through historieal totalization,44 a11 this only shows that the Nietzschean message of the Death of God has not been understood in its full significanee as the Death of Man. But what is too often forgotten when discussing Sartre's polities, is that his own original philosophy-bis eritique of any substantial Ego as a unified subject, bis eritique of morality as fligbt from eontingeney, his eritique of humanism as "spirit of seriousness"-is itself deeply akin to Nietzschean nihilism. Even if, from Being antI Nothingness on, these eritiques are eondueted in tbe name of freedom, it is a freedom of spontaneity, of ereativity and imagination that struetures all aspects of Sartre's tbought. The important differenee with Foucault then is that rather tban developing the implications of this philosophy and rejecting any moral standard external to the movement of freedom itself, Sartre attempts to redireet bis original position towards humanism, in an effort to eonstruet after the war a morality and a polities on a philosophical basis whieh eonstantly undermines what it is supposed to underpin. This diffieult philosophieal posture is, in part at least, the breeding-ground for the anti-political anarebism I have tried to describe above.
lust as Sartre's polities can be understood by referenee to the Freneh Revolution's myth of regeneration and quest for a new social order, inasmueh as this eorresponds to his own quest for legitimaey and for a personal order, Foucault's politics also proceed from that crisis symbolized by the beheading of the King. But for hirn this event, although it does capture the eondition of modem man having lost bis marks, is not the symbol of a new existential or philosophical quest for meaning. Such a quest, aeeording to Foucault, would only lock itself in the interminable experienee of finitude. No longer the symbol of a seareh for a new politieallegitimaey, it is rather the sign that a tradition of polities eoneeived in terms of sovereignty and eentralized power 45 has eome to an end. It ealls for quite a different relation to power, a relation praetieed to some extent by the "irresponsible" anarehists of the seventies who, far from trying to seize power~were inventing ways of ehallenging, mocking and avoiding it. Political theory and praetiee whieh remain in the traditional framework, attempting to extend or to reverse the eontraetual idea of legitimaeỹ GaJlimard, Paris, 1975, eh. 11. by proposing or struggling for alternative forms of power witbout breaking out of tbe model of the former ones, are, in Foucault's view, bopelessly anacbronistic and can only produce repeated failures. Wbat is required is not so much a new political theory but an attitudinal leap which accepts the impossibility of any general political project. In this view, Sartre's entire personal/political itinerary expresses this anachronistie stance (partieularly his relationship to marxism) since he endlessly both seeks IOd nains the possibility of such a project; whereas Foucault strives, not to overcome the problem, but to reveal it by an original approach to power (as dispersed, multi-facetted) and to resistance (as immanent to power itself.)46 However, rather than trying to read Sartre through Foucault's categories, or the reverse, I would luggest tbat just as they found themselves side by side in the streets on various issues in the early seventies, Sartre's humanist anarchism and Foucault's nihilist anarchism, albeit with radically differing styles and explieit aspirations, nevertheless echo eaeh other as two ways of answering an original and common philosophieal experience of powerlessness-and this, I think, by both pointing ultimately to the aesthetic spbere of existence.
Tbe notion of "transgression" by which G. Bataille characterizes eroticism 47 provides a way of understanding Foucault's theoretical (or should one say: antitheoretical) stance, as an overstepping ofthe limits given by a nde but imperatively requiring that rule in order to perpetuate itself as a transgression. This also seems to be what is at stake in an anarchism which rejects any alternative political system, has 00 other end than its own movement of revolt and feeds off the power relations it is forever challenging. Doesn't this also suggest a way to understand Sartre's social ethic based on the surge of freedom with all its political consequences, eveo if these are constantly claimiog to express the very opposite of an aesthetic of transgression, namely an ethic of effective action and historical transformation? Sartre's politics might best be described and read, not as failure, but as a meticulous and brilliant exposition over forty years of what, in Foucault's thought, is tbe implicit starting point: "qui perd gagne" (loser takes all).48
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